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CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
WASHINGTON'S LIMIT ON NONECONOMIC
DAMAGES IN CASES OF PERSONAL
INJURY AND DEATH
In 1986 the Washington legislature passed a tort reform act, to ame-
liorate a perceived crisis in the availability and cost of liability insur-
ance.2 One of the act's provisions limits the amount of noneconomic
damages recoverable in personal injury and wrongful death actions.3
Cases to which this damages limit applies began coming to trial only
in the past few months. In October 1987, one judge applied the limit
to reduce a jury verdict by over one million dollars.4
1. Tort Law Revisions (Tort Reform Act), ch. 305, 1986 Wash. Laws 1354 (codified as
amended in scattered titles of WASH. REV. CODE (1987)).
2. Id. § 100.
3. Id. § 301 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.250 (1987)). The section provides in
relevant part as follows:
[(1)] (b) "Noneconomic damages" means subjective, nonmonetary losses, including, but
not limited to pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, disability or disfigurement
incurred by the injured party, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of
consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation, and destruction of the parent-child
relationship.
(2) In no action seeking damages for personal injury or death may a claimant recover a
judgment for noneconomic damages exceeding an amount determined by multiplying 0.43
by the average annual wage and by the life expectancy of the person incurring noneconomic
damages, as the life expectancy is determined by the life expectancy tables adopted by the
insurance commissioner. For purposes of determining the maximum amount allowable for
noneconomic damages, a claimant's life expectancy shall not be less than fifteen years. The
limitation contained in this subsection applies to all claims for noneconomic damages made
by a claimant who incurred bodily injury. Claims for loss of consortium, loss of society and
companionship, destruction of the parent-child relationship, and all other derivative claims
asserted by persons who did not sustain bodily injury are to be included within the
limitation on claims for noneconomic damages arising from the same bodily injury.
(3) If a case is tried to a jury, the jury shall not be informed of the limitation contained
in subsection (2) of this section.
4. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 87-2-00407-6 (Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 1987). In Sofie the
jury awarded the plaintiff $1,345,833, of which the jury allocated $1,154,592 to noneconomic
damages. Special Verdict Form at 2, Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 87-2-00407-6 (Wash. Super.
Ct. Oct. 30, 1987). The court reduced noneconomic damages to $125,136 and granted the
plaintiff a judgment of $316,377, in conformity with the statutory cap. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp.,
No. 87-2-00407-6, slip op. at 2-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 1987).
Some trial courts have held the Washington limit unconstitutional. Kg., Carter v. Fibreboard
Corp., No. 87-2-03555-7 (Wash. Super. Ct. order on pre-trial motion Feb. 19, 1988) (defense of
Section 4.56.250 damages limit struck down as violative of equal protection and jury trial
guarantees of Washington constitution); Foster v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 87-2-05629-5 (Wash.
Super. Ct. order on pre-trial motion Sept. 18, 1987) (defense of Section 4.56.250 struck down on
equal protection and jury trial grounds).
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Similar damages limits have been challenged in other states on
numerous federal and state constitutional grounds, including substan-
tive due process,' equal protection,6 a right of trial by jury,7 special
legislation,8 special privilege,9 and a right of access to the courts. 10 By
a slight majority, courts have declared the limits unconstitutional."1
This Comment considers the constitutionality of the Washington
cap on noneconomic damages. The Comment briefly reviews the
recent legislation of medical malpractice and tort reform damages ceil-
ings and judicial decisions on the constitutionality of such ceilings.
The Comment then analyzes the constitutionality of the Washington
limit under the substantive due process and equal protection guaran-
tees of the federal and state constitutions.12 Because under the federal
constitution a court should give the statute only minimal scrutiny, the
statute probably does not offend fourteenth amendment protections.
Under the Washington Constitution, however, a court should give the
statute intermediate scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny a court
probably will hold that the limit violates the state equal protection
guarantee, but a court probably will not hold the limit violative of
substantive due process. Under the right of trial by jury guarantee of
the state constitution, the statute also is unconstitutional.
1 3
5. E.g., Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 157, 695 P.2d 665, 679, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 368, 382, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985).
6. E.g., Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 129 (N.D. 1978).
7. E.g., Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 788 (W.D. Va. 1986).
8. See, e.g., Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp., 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (1976)
(citing ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 prohibition of special legislation).
9. E.g., Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657, 668-69 (1977).
10. E.g., Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1087 (Fla. 1987). For an annotated
list of many of the recent decisions in this area, see Table: Reported Decisions on the
Constitutionality of Medical Malpractice and Tort Reform Damages Limits [hereinafter Table],
infra p. 675. For citations to these decisions, see infra notes 38-49.
11. See infra Table p. 675.
12. Federal and Washington constitutional challenges are considered separately here because
the proper standard of review in substantive due process and equal protection challenges of the
damages limit should be higher under the Washington Constitution than under the federal
constitution. See infra notes 106-28 and accompanying text.
13. For additional commentary on the constitutionality of the Washington noneconomic
damages limit, see Wiggins, Harnitiaux & Whaley, Washington's 1986 Tort Legislation and the
State Constitution: Testing the Limits, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 193 (1986/87); Development in the
Law, The 1986 Washington Tort Reform Act: Noneconomic Damages Cap (RCW 4.56.250), 23
WILLAMET-rE L. REV. 215 (1987).
Vol. 63:653, 1988
Washington's Noneconomic Damages Limit
I. BACKGROUND
A. Insurance Crises and Damages Limits
Many damages limits now in effect are part of state medical mal-
practice legislation of the mid-1970's.14 During that period, state leg-
islatures perceived that medical malpractice insurance had become
widely unavailable and increasingly expensive." Virtually all legisla-
tures responded to this insurance crisis by enacting laws to control
medical malpractice litigation. 6 In at least one-fifth of the states,
these laws included provisions to limit recoverable damages. 7 The
provisions limit either the liability of each defendant, 8 the recovery of
each plaintiff,19 or both.2" Nearly all the limits are flat figures21 that
apply either to noneconomic damages only,22 nonmedical damages
only,23 or all damages. 24
A different insurance crisis arose in the mid-1980's. During that
period, the cost of liability insurance increased not only for health care
providers" but also for day care centers, architects, commercial fisher-
men, and other businesses and professions.26 Many businesses and
local governments found liability insurance difficult to obtain.27 In
14. See, eg., statutes cited infra notes 18-24.
15. See Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis"
Constitutional Implications, 55 TEx. L. REv. 759, 759-60 (1977); Note, Fein v. Permanente
Medical Group: Future Trends in Damage Limitation Adjudication, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1643,
1649 n.49 (1986).
16. See, eg., Witherspoon, Constitutionality of the Texas Statute Limiting Liability for
Medical Malpractice, 10 TEx. TECH L. REv. 419, 419 (1979).
17. See Bell, Legislative Intrusions into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice" Thoughts
About the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 939, 945 (1984).
18. Kg., TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 11.02 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
19. Kg., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Anderson 1981).
20. Kg., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Burns 1983); NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2825 (Supp.
1986).
21. Kg., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Anderson 1981) ($200,000 limit on general
damages); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-8 (Michie Supp. 1987) ($1,000,000 limit on noneconomic
damages).
22. Eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1988).
23. Kg., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42 (West 1977 & Supp. 1988); TEX. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 11.02 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
24. Eg., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Burns 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825 (Supp.
1986).
25. Bell, supra note 17, at 939; Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier. Constitutional
Attacks on Medical Malpractice Laws 38 OKLA. L. REV. 195, 195 n.1 (1985), reprinted in 35
DEF. LJ. 359 (1986).
26. Newsday, Oct. 29, 1985, at 11, col. 3.
27. Sugarman, Taking Advantage of the Torts Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 333-34 n.19
(1987) (citing U.S. ATry's GEN. TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, REPORT OF THE TORT
POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, ExTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 6-14 (1986)).
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Washington State, a legislative committee formed to study the crisis
found that it had been caused by a combination of poor management
practices in the insurance industry and rising litigation costs and
awards.28
Washington was one of a number of states to respond to the crisis
by enacting tort reform legislation29 that included a limit on the recov-
ery of noneconomic damages.3 ° Under the Washington statute, the
limit varies with the plaintiff's life expectancy and the average annual
state wage.31 The limit at present ranges from $125,136 for a male
aged sixty-four or older to $632,606 for a newborn female.32
Washington imposes no other statutory ceiling on damages recover-
able in personal injury and wrongful death actions. Other states
have limited recovery of damages in common-law causes of action
by such legislation as automobile accident victim compensation
acts33 and in statutory causes of action by such legislation as dram-
shop acts, 34 governmental tort claims acts, 35 and wrongful death
28. JOINT STUDY COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY,
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE (Nov. 13, 1985) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
29. Sugarman, supra note 27, at 347. Among other things, Washington's act limits
noneconomic damages, provides for review of plaintiffs attorneys fees, modifies joint and several
liability, modifies the statute of limitations for malpractice cases, and permits structured awards
or periodic payments of future economic damages over $100,000. Peck, Washington's Partial
Rejection and Modification of the Common Law Rule of Joint and Several Liability, 62 WASH. L.
REV. 233, 233 n.3 (1987).
30. Sugarman, supra note 27, at 348 & n.115 (citing a $500,000 limit in Alaska that does not
apply to "disfigurement or severe physical impairment," a $450,000 limit in Florida, a $350,000
limit in Maryland, a $400,000 limit in Minnesota that does not apply to "pain, disability or
disfigurement," and an $875,000 limit in New Hampshire); Reistrup, The Final Frontiers, Nat'l
L.J., Dec. 7, 1987 at 13, col. 1 (citing a $400,000 limit in Idaho, a $250,000 limit in Kansas, a
review of the reasonableness of awards over $250,000 in North Dakota, and a $500,000 limit in
Oregon).
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.250(2) (1987).
32. See id.; 6 WASH. SUP. CT. COMM'N ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, WASH. PRACTICE,
WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, App. B ("Life Expectancy Table [Revised]") (2d
ed. Supp. 1984) (based on WASH. STATE INS. COMM'R, COMMISSIONERS STANDARD ORDINARY
TABLE OF MORTALITY (1980)); WASH. STATE EMPLOYMENT SEC. DEP'T LABOR MKT. &
ECON. ANALYSIS BRANCH, AVERAGE ANNUAL STATE WAGE (1986). The limit for a 64-year-
old or older male is calculated by multiplying 0.43 (the statutory factor) by a life expectancy of
15 years (the statutory minimum life expectancy) by $19,401 (the average annual state wage).
33. See, e.g., the Illinois statute cited in Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474
(1972) (recovery for certain noneconomic loss tied to amount of medical expenses).
34. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, para. 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) ($15,000 to $40,000
limits on recovery from liquor supplier for injuries inflicted by intoxicated person).
35. E.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-403 (Supp. 1987) (liability 6f local
government may not exceed $200,000 per individual claim and $500,000 per total claims arising
from same tortious occurrence); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-B:4 (Supp. 1987) (limits of
$150,000 per claimant and $500,000 per occurrence on amount recoverable in personal injury
action against governmental subdivision).
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acts.36 Under the federal Price-Anderson Act, Congress imposes a
limit of $560,000,000 on the liability of a federally-licensed nuclear
power plant for damages arising from a nuclear accident.37
B. Judicial Response to Damages Limits
Several reported decisions address the constitutionality of medical
malpractice and tort reform damages limits. The medical malpractice
limits of California,38 Indiana,39 and Nebraska 4° have been upheld.
The tort reform limit of Florida4 and the medical malpractice limits
of Illinois,4 2 New Hampshire,43 North Dakota,' Ohio,4" and Vir-
ginia 46 have been invalidated. Courts had split, as to the constitution-
ality of the Texas medical malpractice damages cap, but the Texas
Supreme Court recently held the limit invalid.47 The constitutionality
of the medical malpractice limits of Idaho48 and Louisiana49 have been
considered but not fully decided in reported decisions; those courts
remanded the issue to the trial level. Damages limits in state automo-
36. E-g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1959) (recovery for wrongful death limited
in some instances to from $20,000 to $30,000).
37. Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1983 & Supp. 1986).
38. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368,
appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985).
39. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
40. Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
41. Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
42. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp., 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
43. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
44. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
45. Duren v. Suburban Community Hosp., 24 Ohio Misc. 2d 25, 495 N.E.2d 51 (Ohio C.P.
1985); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio C.P.
1976) (dictum).
46. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986).
47. Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1986) (constitutional under federal
constitution; court certified to Texas Supreme Court whether cap was valid under Texas
constitution); Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (unconstitutional); Rose
v. Doctors Hosp. Facilities, 735 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (constitutional), overruled,
Lucas v. United States, No. C-6181 (Tex. May 11, 1988) (WESTLAW, Allstates database); Detar
Hosp. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359 (rex. Ct. App. 1985) (unconstitutional); Malone & Hyde, Inc.
v. Hobrecht, 685 S.W.2d 739 (rex. Ct. App. 1985) (unconstitutional); Baptist Hosp. v. Baber,
672 S.W.2d 296 (rex. Ct. App. 1984) (unconstitutional).
In Lucas the certified question of whether the cap was constitutional under the Texas
Constitution was answered in the negative by the Texas Supreme Court in May 1988. The Texas
court held that the damages limit violated the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution.
Lucas v. United States, No. C-6181 (Tex. May 11, 1988) (WESTLAW, Allstates database).
48. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
914 (1977). On remand, the limit was held unconstitutional. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781,
785 n.2 (W.D. Va. 1986) (citing Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, Nos. 55527, 55586 (4th Dist.
Idaho Nov. 3, 1980)).
49. Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985).
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bile accident victim compensation acts,5" dramshop acts,5 govern-
mental tort claims acts,52 and wrongful death acts 3 also have been
challenged on constitutional grounds.
The United States Supreme Court validated two damages ceilings
under the federal constitution. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envi-
ronmental Study Group 54 the Court upheld the federal Price-Ander-
son Act limit on nuclear power plant liability." In Fein v. Permanente
Medical Group 5 6 the Court dismissed the appeal from the California
Supreme Court's ruling that California's medical malpractice
noneconomic damages limit was constitutional. The Court dismissed
the appeal for want of a substantial federal question. 7
50. E.g., Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972) (Illinois auto accident
victim recovery limit unconstitutional).
51. E.g., Cunningham v. Brown, 22 111. 2d 23, 174 N.E.2d 153 (1961) (Illinois dramshop act
damages cap constitutional); McGuire v. C & L Restaurant, 346 N.W.2d 605 (Minn. 1984)
(Minnesota dramshop act damages cap unconstitutional).
52. E.g., White v. State, 203 Mont. 363, 661 P.2d 1272 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a
statute that denied recovery of noneconomic damages and limited recovery of economic damages
from state and its subdivisions, but upholding a statute that denied recovery of punitive
damages); Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H. 661, 406 A.2d 704 (1979) (statutory
limit of $50,000 per claimant in recovery against governmental subdivisions for bodily injury
constitutional), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 921 (1980).
53. E.g., Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958) (wrongful death act recovery
limit of $25,000 constitutional).
54. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
55. The Court held that the limit did not deny fifth amendment due process because the limit
was supported by the need to encourage private industry to participate in the development of
nuclear energy resources and by the federal government's commitment to protect the public from
the consequences of a nuclear disaster. Id. at 84-87. The limit did not deny equal protection
because the differing treatment of those injured in nuclear accidents and those injured in other
types of accidents was justified by the "general rationality" of the Act. Id. at 93-94.
56. 474 U.S. 892 (1985).
57. Id. at 892. Justice White dissented to the dismissal on the grounds that the appeal raised
the unresolved issue of whether due process requires a statutory compensation scheme to be a
quid pro quo for the common-law or statutory remedy it replaces. Id. at 894-95 (White, J.,
dissenting).
Because Fein was a summary disposition, its precedential value is unclear. See Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 784-85 n.5 (1983) ("A summary disposition affirms only the judgment
of the court below, and no more may be read into our action than was essential to sustain that
judgment."); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975) ("[T]he lower courts are bound by
summary decisions by this Court '"until such time as the Court informs [them] that [they] are
not."' " (brackets original) (quoting Doe v. Hodgson, 478 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir.), cert denied,
414 U.S. 1096 (1973))). Indeed, subsequent decisions by federal courts on the federal
constitutionality of state medical malpractice damages limits have not recognized the Fein
dismissal as precedential or persuasive. See, e.g., Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102 (N.D.
Tex. 1986) (Texas medical malpractice damages cap unconstitutional under federal and state
equal protection guarantees); Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986) (Virginia cap
unconstitutional under jury trial right of state and federal constitutions).
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II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE WASHINGTON LIMIT
A. United States Constitution: Due Process and Equal Protection
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides in part that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."58 Under these
clauses, Washington's damages cap is subject to attack on the grounds
that it denies substantive due process by depriving personal injury
plaintiffs of property without providing an adequate benefit in return59
and denies the equal protection of the laws by discriminating against
or among injured plaintiffs. These challenges are considered, first, by
determining the appropriate standard of review, and second, by apply-
ing the appropriate standard to the statute. Because the federal consti-
tution requires only minimal scrutiny of the statute, the statute
probably does not offend either due process or equal protection.
1. Standard of Review
The United States Supreme Court currently subjects legislation
challenged on substantive due process and equal protection grounds to
three standards of review.' The Court applies the same standard
whether the legislation is challenged on substantive due process or
equal protection grounds.61 Strict scrutiny is applied where the effect
of legislation is either to create a suspect classification62 or to infringe
58. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
59. Since the 1930's the United States Supreme Court has more often applied equal protection
than substantive due process analysis to legislation challenged on fourteenth amendment
grounds, and has rarely declared state legislation unconstitutional on substantive due process
grounds. Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 775 (N.D. 1974); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 352 (3d ed. 1986). The Washington Supreme Court has
become similarly disenchanted with substantive due process. See Aetna Life Ins. v. Washington
Life & Disability Guar., 83 Wash. 2d 523, 533-34, 520 P.2d 162, 169 (1974); Seattle Times v.
Tielsch, 80 Wash. 2d 502, 512, 495 P.2d 1366, 1371 (1972) (Finley, J., dissenting) ("the now
dormant specter of substantive due process"). Nevertheless, the United States and Washington
Supreme Courts still recognize a substantive due process barrier to unreasonable state regulation.
See, eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (state criminal abortion statute violates due
process); State v. Santos, 104 Wash. 2d 142, 148, 702 P.2d 1179, 1183 (1985) (substantive due
process requires accuracy in establishing paternity).
Although a number of courts have considered substantive due process challenges of statutory
damages caps, no reported decisions have invalidated medical malpractice or tort reform
damages ceilings on substantive due process grounds. See infra Table p. 675.
60. See 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 323-26 (1986).
61. Id. at 323.
62. E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (classification based on race).
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on a fundamental right. 63 Legislation is unconstitutional under strict
scrutiny if it is not necessary to the promotion of a compelling state
interest. The Court recently has applied intermediate scrutiny to
review legislation that creates classifications based on gender, alienage,
or legitimacy.' Under the intermediate standard, legislation is uncon-
stitutional if it does not both serve important governmental objectives
and bear a substantial relationship to the accomplishment of those
objectives. 65 Rational basis, or minimal, scrutiny is applied to most
economic and social welfare legislation. Under the rational basis test
there is a strong presumption of constitutionality, 66 and legislation is
invalid only if the classification created by the legislation is not ration-
ally related to any conceivable legitimate legislative purpose.67
The federal constitution requires only minimal scrutiny of the
Washington damages ceiling. Strict scrutiny is inappropriate because
the ceiling neither creates suspect classifications nor affects fundamen-
tal rights. The limit creates only economic 68 and age69 classifications.
The Court has not held such classifications suspect.7° Further, the
right to compensation for personal injuries is not fundamental under
63. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to privacy).
64. 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 326-27 (1986). The intermediate standard is known also as
"means-focus," "means scrutiny," and the "substantial relationship" test. See Jones v. State Bd.
of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399, 407 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Carson v.
Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980). The Court does not appear to have applied
intermediate scrutiny to legislation challenged on substantive due process grounds under the
federal constitution, nor has any other court in a reported decision applied intermediate scrutiny
to a federal substantive due process challenge of a medical malpractice or tort reform damages
cap.
65. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
66. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
67. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). At least one commentator
suggests that the Court should give the rational basis test "teeth" such that a court would
consider whether a basis exists in reality rather than merely in the court's imagination. G.
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 604-05 (1 1th ed. 1985).
68. Washington's limit creates the following economic classifications: First, it classifies
according to whether damages are economic or noneconomic and discriminates in the case of the
latter, and second, it classifies according to whether damages are above or below the limit and
discriminates in the case of the former.
69. Washington's limit classifies according to age by permitting plaintiffs with shorter life
expectancies less recovery than plaintiffs with longer life expectancies. For example, PlaintiffA,
a newborn male, has a life expectancy of 70.83 years. WASH. SUP. CT. COMM'N ON JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 32. Plaintiff B, a 63-year-old male, has a life expectancy of 15.38
years. Id. The average annual state wage is $19,401. WASH. STATE EMPLOYMENT SEC. DEP'T
LABOR MKT. & ECON. ANALYSIS BRANCH, supra note 32. The statute limits Plaintiff B's
noneconomic damages to $128,307. However, Plaintiff A's limit is $590,894.
70. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 83 (1978) (economic
classification not suspect); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976)
(age classification not suspect); 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON
660
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the federal constitution.71 A fundamental right is one explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the constitution. 2 The right to recover in
tort is not so guaranteed.73
Intermediate scrutiny also is inappropriate under the federal consti-
tution. The United States Supreme Court has applied the intermediate
standard only to classifications based on gender,74 alienage,75 and
legitimacy.76 The Court recently gave minimal rather than intermedi-
ate scrutiny to classifications based on age7 7 and on the type and
degree of personal injury where the affected right was the right to col-
lect full damages.78 The statute's age-based classification does inciden-
tally create a gender-based classification, because women generally
have longer life expectancies than men.7 9 The gender-based classifica-
tion, however, is only incidental to the age-based classification and
does not reflect invidious gender-based discrimination. It therefore
should not trigger intermediate scrutiny. 0 The apparent purpose of
the age-based classification is to increase the potential recovery as the
potential life span increases.8 ' It is consistent with this purpose that if
women live longer, they suffer greater noneconomic loss and should be
allowed greater recovery.
Minimal scrutiny also is proper under the 1978 decision of the
United States Supreme Court to apply minimal scrutiny to a damages
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 335 (1986) (age classification not
suspect).
71. Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir. 1985); see Duke Power Co., 438
U.S. at 83-84.
72. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
73. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 787 (W.D. Va. 1986).
74. Eg., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
75. Eg., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982).
76. Eg., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268, 275-76 (1978).
77. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
78. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 83-84 (1978).
79. Between birth and age 98, women have greater life expectancies than men. For example,
Plaintiff B, a 63-year-old male, has a life expectancy of 15.38 years. WASH. Sup. CT. COMM'N
ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 32. However, Plaintiff C, a 63-year-old female, has a life
expectancy of 18.86 years. Id Assuming an average annual state wage of $19,401, PlaintiffB's
noneconomic damages are limited to $128,307, while Plaintiff C might recover noneconomic
damages of up to $157,338.
80. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
81. The legislature's reasoning might have been that pain and suffering damages should be
greater for a plantiffwho will have to endure pain and suffering longer. This "assumes that in all
cases the injured victim will have ongoing injuries and ongoing future suffering, which is clearly
not the case .... [Not] all injured victims will continue to suffer for the future." Foster v.
Fibreboard Corp., No. 87-2-05629-5, slip op. at 9 (Wash. Super. Ct. order on pre-trial motion
Sept. 18, 1987) (granting motion to strike defense of noneconomic damages cap on equal
protection and right to jury trial grounds).
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limit similar to the Washington cap. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group 82 the Court found that the Price-Ander-
son Act's $560,000,000 nuclear power plant liability limit was "a clas-
sic example of an economic regulation-a legislative effort to structure
and accommodate 'the burdens and benefits of economic life.' -83 In
the Price-Anderson Act, Congress encouraged the availability of
nuclear power by reducing the liability of nuclear power plants.84
Washington's noneconomic damages limit seems to have arisen out
of a similar legislative effort. The Washington legislature sought to
encourage the availability and affordability of liability insurance for
governmental, professional, and other entities by reducing the awards
of some personal injury plaintiffs. Particularly because the Court in
Duke Power Co. considered a damages limit, Duke Power Co. is strong
authority that a damages cap should not be given more than minimal
scrutiny under the federal constitution."
2. Application of Review
Under a rational basis standard of review, Washington's non-
economic damages limit probably does not violate the federal constitu-
tional guarantee of substantive due process. The test is whether the
challenged law is rationally related86 to a valid state objective.87 This
suggests two inquiries: First, whether there is a valid state objective,
and second, whether the statute has a rational relation to that
objective.
Any conceivable legitimate state objective satisfies the first require-
ment. The stated purpose of the Washington Tort Reform Act was to
"create a more equitable distribution of the cost and risk of injury and
82. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
83. Id. at 83 (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
84. Id. at 84.
85. A majority of recent decisions supports this conclusion. See infra Table p. 000. In Carson
v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980), the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded
that heightened scrutiny of New Hampshire's recovery limit was not required under the federal
constitution, since the United States Supreme Court had applied heightened scrutiny only in
"cases involving classifications based upon gender and illegitimacy." Id. at 831. Instead, the
Carson court went on to apply heightened scrutiny-the substantial relationship test-under the
state constitution. Id.
86. The dictionary definitions of the key components of this test might be useful references,
since courts sometimes have little guidance in applying the test other than the plain meaning of
these words. "Rationally" means reasonably or sensibly. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1885 (1981). "Related" means "connected by reason of an
established or discoverable relation." Id. at 1916. Compare the key component of the
substantial relationship test: "Substantial" means materially, importantly, or essentially. See id.
at 2280.
87. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
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increase the availability and affordability of insurance."88 The legisla-
ture determined that a serious liability insurance problem existed
within the state. Insurance unavailability and unaffordability had
caused some entities either to cease operating, for want of insurance,
or to operate without insurance. Without insurance, many entities
might be unable to pay tort judgments due injured plaintiffs. Under
these facts, making liability insurance more available and affordable
seems a valid legislative objective.
Moreover, the damages limit appears rationally related to the legis-
lature's purpose. The limit is arbitrary to the extent that it relies on
the product of an individual's age, the average annual state wage, and
the figure 0.43.89 However, the Court in Duke Power Co. did not find
this kind of arbitrariness fatal to the constitutionality of the statute.90
Limiting recoverable noneconomic damages could rationally be
related to a reduction in insurer uncertainties and liabilities. This
reduction could rationally be related to an increase in insurance avail-
ability and a reduction in insurance rates. Because there appears to be
a rational relation between the damages limit and a valid state objec-
tive, the limit probably is not unconstitional on federal substantive due
process grounds.
Under rational basis review, Washington's limit similarly does not
appear to violate the federal equal protection guarantee. 91 The proper
test is whether the challenged classification is rationally related to a
conceivable legitimate governmental purpose.92 This test is virtually
identical to the substantive due process test and is equally deferential
to the legislature. The legislature's desire to make liability insurance
available and affordable to governmental, professional, and other enti-
ties is a legitimate governmental purpose.93 The economic 94 and age95
classifications created by the damages cap seem rationally related to
that purpose, because it is rational to believe that these classifications
88. 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305, § 100.
89. See WASH. REv. CODE § 4.56.250(2) (1987).
90. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 86 (1978).
91. Contra Foster v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 87-2-05629-5, slip op. at 9 (Wash. Super. Ct.
order on pre-trial motion Sept. 18, 1987) (Washington's noneconomic damages cap denies equal
protection under rational basis test).
92. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981) (pertinent inquiry is whether classification
advances legitimate legislative goals in a rational fashion); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522,
530 (1959) (legislative classification valid if based upon a state of facts that reasonably can be
conceived to constitute a distinction or difference in state policy).
93. See supra text accompanying note 88.
94. See supra note 68.
95. See supra note 69.
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will reduce tort judgments, insurer liability, and insurance rates.9 6
The age classification, for example, is rationally related to the legiti-
mate objective of allowing relatively greater compensation for
noneconomic loss to plaintiffs who will endure their intangible losses
over a longer period of time.9 7 Because these classifications are ration-
ally related to a legitimate governmental purpose, they do not uncon-
stitutionally deny equal protection under the federal constitution.
B. Washington Constitution: Due Process and Equal Protection
A court should apply a higher standard of review to substantive due
process and equal protection challenges to the statute under the Wash-
ington Constitution than under the federal constitution. The United
States Supreme Court acknowledges the authority of state courts to
interpret state constitutional guarantees to be more protective of indi-
vidual rights than the federal counterparts.98 Washington courts in a
number of cases have exercised this authority.99
The Washington Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.""
Although this adopts verbatim the federal due process guarantee, 0 1
Washington courts have held that federal case law interpreting the
federal due process clause does not bind judicial interpretation of the
state due process clause.' a The Washington Constitution provides
further that "[n]o law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of
citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities
which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or
corporations."'' 03 While the Washington Supreme Court has held that
this provision and the federal equal protection provision are substan-
96. It is irrelevant that the cap is not the most direct or complete means by which the
legislature could achieve its objective, because the legislature is free to attack perceived problems
one step at a time. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
97. Contra Foster v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 87-2-05629-5, slip op. at 9 (Wash. Super. Ct.
order on pre-trial motion Sept. 18, 1987) ("There is no rational relationship for distinguishing
between two individual victims otherwise similarly situated with respect to injury simply because
of age.").
98. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
99. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and
the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 491, 493 (1984).
100. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3.
101. Compare id. with U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
102. Petstel, Inc. v. County of King, 77 Wash. 2d 144, 153, 459 P.2d 937, 942 (1969).
However, federal case law is given great weight and prevails to the extent it affords greater
protection. Id.; Olympic Forest Products v. Chaussee Corp., 82 Wash. 2d 418, 422, 511 P.2d
1002, 1005 (1973) (procedural due process challenge).
103. WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 12. This section is entitled, "Special Privileges and Immunities
Prohibited."
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tially identical despite their differing language,"° Washington courts
also consistently have held that the Washington equal protection pro-
vision may be interpreted to provide greater individual rights than the
federal guarantee.10
5
1. Standard of Review
Washington courts reviewing legislation under the state constitution
use the same three standards of review currently applied by the United
States Supreme Court under the federal constitution.'0 6 However,
Washington courts do not apply these standards in the same manner
as the United States Supreme Court. Instead, Washington courts
sometimes subject challenged legislation to higher standards of review
than are applicable under the federal constitution.
For example, in State v. Wood 10 7 the Washington Supreme Court
noted that the United States Supreme Court had not yet found gender-
based classifications suspect and thus subject to strit scrutiny.'08 The
Washington court held, however, that under the Washington equal
protection guarantee gender was a suspect classification "requiring
strict scrutiny to determine whether the State has demonstrated a
compelling state interest to uphold such classification."' 1 9 Again, in
Darrin v. Gould 11o the Washington Supreme Court acknowledged that
the United States Supreme Court had found neither that gender-based
classifications were suspect, nor that education was a fundamental
right."' Nevertheless, the Washington court held that an education
free from sexual discrimination was a fundamental right under the
Washington Constitution. 12  Wood, Darrin, and other Washington
104. State v. Perrigoue, 81 Wash. 2d 640, 503 P.2d 1063 (1972). The federal provision
requires that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
105. See, eg., Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 868, 540 P.2d 882, 888 (1975); State v.
Alfonso, 41 Wash. App. 121, 126, 702 P.2d 1218, 1221 (1985).
106. See, eg., State v. Rice, 98 Wash. 2d 384, 655 P.2d 1145 (1982) (strict scrutiny); Griffin v.
Department of Social & Health Servs., 91 Wash. 2d 616, 590 P.2d 816 (1979) (minimal scrutiny);
State v. Wood, 89 Wash. 2d 97, 569 P.2d 1148 (1977) (strict scrutiny); Hunter v. North Mason
School Dist., 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975) (intermediate scrutiny); Washington Ass'n of
Child Care Agencies v. Thompson, 34 Wash. App. 225, 660 P.2d 1124 (1983) (minimal
scrutiny).
107. 89 Wash. 2d 97, 569 P.2d 1148 (1977).
108. Id at 100, 569 P.2d at 1150.
109. Id The United States Supreme Court has held that gender-based classifications deserve
intermediate, but not strict, scrutiny. Eg., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
110. 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
111. Id at 865-66, 540 P.2d at 886-87.
112. Id at 870, 540 P.2d at 888. The right to an education free from sexual discrimination is
provided by the Washington Constitution. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
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decisions, as well as case law in other states and considerations of pub-
lic policy, strongly suggest that Washington courts should apply a
higher standard of review to Washington's noneconomic damages cap.
a. Washington Case Law
Under Washington case law the right to be compensated for per-
sonal injuries is important enough that statutes burdening the right
trigger intermediate scrutiny. 1 3  In 1975 the Washington Supreme
Court held in Hunter v. North Mason School District"' that
[t]he right to be indemnified 15 for personal injuries is a substantial
property right .... Statutory classifications which substantially burden
such rights as to some individuals but not others are permissible under
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if they
are "reasonable, not arbitrary, and ... rest upon some ground of differ-
ence having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation,
so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. ' 16
Application of this intermediate standard should be extended to the
right to the full recovery of noneconomic damages. A damages cap
significantly affects the right to be indemnified. Indemnification is the
restoration of the victim of a loss," 7 and in Washington such restora-
tion includes compensation for noneconomic loss."' Washington's
113. See Carter v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 87-2-03555-7, slip op. at 20 (Wash. Super. Ct. order
on pre-trial motion Feb. 19, 1988). No reported Washington decisions have characterized the
right to recover in tort as "fundamental" so as to trigger strict scrutiny in substantive due process
or equal protection analysis.
114. 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975).
115. The Hunter court seems to have meant "indemnified" to include the proper elements of
negligence damages, which at the time of Hunter included noneconomic damages such as pain
and suffering.
116. Hunter, 85 Wash. 2d at 814, 539 P.2d at 848 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)) (additional citations omitted). The standard applied in Hunter is more
intense than the rational basis test. See Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d
399, 407 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d
825, 830-31 (1980); Rose v. Doctors Hosp. Facilities, 735 S.W.2d 244, 249 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
But see Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585, 600 (1980). The Johnson
court applied "the fair and substantial relationship test" to Indiana's damages cap in the
apparent belief that it was invoking only minimal scrutiny. See 404 N.E.2d at 600-01.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina EnvtL Study Group
three years after Hunter suggests that the Hunter court was incorrect to apply intermediate
scrutiny under the federal constitution. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,
438 U.S. 59 (1978). The Hunter court instead might safely have relied solely on the state equal
protection clause. See Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 477 So. 2d 1094, 1104-07 (La. 1985);
Carson, 424 A.2d at 831.
117. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 692 (5th ed. 1979).
118. See Shaw v. United States, 741 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1984). The court in Shaw noted that
Washington law permitted recovery of damages for pain and suffering and other noneconomic
damages, and that under Washington law such damages were compensatory. Id at 1208.
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limit in one case reduced the aggregate damages award by eighty-six
percent. 19 This is as significant an infringement on the right to
indemnification as was the statute challenged in Hunter, which statute
effectively eliminated the plaintiff's cause of action.1
20
b. Case Law in Other States
In some cases, courts in other states have applied intermediate scru-
tiny to state due process and equal protection challenges of damages
caps. While the rational basis test has been applied more often, the
decisions to invoke intermediate scrutiny show greater sensitivity to
the discriminatory effect of damages ceilings and the nature of the
interests at stake. In one case, a court invoked intermediate scrutiny
partly in reliance on the Washington Supreme Court's decision in
Hunter v. North Mason School District.121
In Carson v. Maurer 122 the New Hampshire court cited the Wash-
ington court's holding in Hunter that the right to recover for personal
injuries is a substantial property right.1 23 The Carson court found that
characterization compelling, concluding that "the rights involved
herein are sufficiently important to require that the restrictions
imposed on those rights be subjected to a more rigorous judicial scru-
tiny than allowed under the rational basis test."' 124 The court
acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court had restricted
application of intermediate scrutiny to cases involving classifications
based on gender and illegitimacy, but announced that it was free to
grant individuals greater protections under the state constitution.
125
119. See Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 87-2-00407-6, slip op. at 2 (Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 30,
1987).
120. The Hunter court invalidated a Washington statute that required persons with claims
against certain governmental bodies to either file their claims with those bodies within 120 days
of the date the claim arose or forfeit those claims. 85 Wash. 2d at 811 n.1, 539 P.2d at 846 n.1.
121. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (citing Hunter v. North Mason
School Dist., 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975)).
122. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
123. 424 A.2d at 830.
124. Id. Some courts have relied on other grounds to review medical malpractice damages
ceilings under intermediate scrutiny. In Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978), the
North Dakota court relied on its earlier use of intermediate scrutiny of a statute that limited tort
recoveries in Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974). The Hassett court had found
that the United States Supreme Court's then-recent introduction of a new intermediate analysis
closely approximated the test historically used by the North Dakota court. 217 N.W.2d at 775.
In Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 477 So. 2d 1094, 1107-08 (La. 1985), the Louisiana court
found that a damages limit classified people based on their physical condition, a classification
prohibited under the Louisiana Constitution.
125. 424 A.2d at 831.
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In Jones v. State Board of Medicine 126 the Idaho Supreme Court
held that intermediate scrutiny was applicable where "the discrimina-
tory character of a challenged statutory classification is apparent on its
face and where there is also a patent indication of a lack of relation-
ship between the classification and the declared purpose of the stat-
ute." '127 The discriminatory character of the Washington limit is
apparent on its face. The limit facially discriminates against aged and
noneconomically injured plaintiffs. While there may be a rational rela-
tionship between the classification and the declared purpose of the
statute, the lack of a substantial relationship is indicated by the fact
that a reduction in awards of noneconomic damages cannot force
insurers to offer coverage at reasonable rates.
c. Public Policy Considerations
Public policy considerations also compel the use of an intermediate
standard of review. First, courts should carefully scrutinize legislation
that supports a special interest at the expense of a disadvantaged class.
Second, severely injured victims whose noneconomic damages are lim-
ited might as a result receive less than full compensation even for their
economic damages. Noneconomic damages often are that part of the
plaintiff's award that pays the attorney's fee. A reduction in
noneconomic damages may mean that the attorney's share of the total
judgment must be paid from monies that were allocated by the court
to economic damages, such as past and future medical expenses.
2. Application of Review
The discriminatory classifications that Washington's damages limit
creates, rather than the statute's aggregate effect on those it regulates,
render the statute unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny. In
other words, a court should hold that the statute violates the Washing-
ton Constitution's equal protection guarantee but not the substantive
due process guarantee.
A statute satisfies the substantive due process requirement when it is
substantially related 128 to the promotion of a legitimate governmental
126. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
127. 555 P.2d at 411. The court invoked an intermediate standard of review in weighing an
equal protection challenge to Idaho's damages limit, but seemed to invoke only a rational basis
standard to consider a substantive due process challenge to the limit. See id. at 409-10. This
comports with the United States Supreme Court's omission to apply intermediate scrutiny in the
context of substantive due process.
128. "Substantially" means materially, importantly, or essentially. See WEBSTER's THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2280 (1981).
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interest.1 29 The stated object of the Tort Reform Act was to create a
more equitable tort compensation system and increase the availability




The statute probably is not substantially related to that interest.
Although there is evidence that damages ceilings reduce damages
awards, 132 and while it may be rational to believe that a reduction in
damages will lead to an eventual reduction in rates, 133 there is no
apparent substantial relationship between a reduction in damages
judgments and an increase in insurance availability and affordability.
The mid-1980's insurance crisis was caused in part by bad insurance
company management practices.13 4 Further, insurance companies are
not obliged to increase availability and decrease rates as their uncer-
tainties and liabilities decrease. In view of these other influences on
insurance availability and rates, the relationship between the statute's
means and end seems rational but not substantial.
Yet even if there is not a substantial relationship between the statute
and the legislature's purpose, courts are likely to discredit a substan-
tive due process challenge for three reasons. First, courts may refuse to
apply intermediate scrutiny to the challenge, even while applying such
scrutiny to an equal protection challenge. 35  Second, courts may
avoid substantive due process challenges if they can dispose of a case
on equal protection grounds. Washington courts rarely in recent years
have invalidated legislation on substantive due process grounds.
136
Third, Washington courts may defer to the decisions of courts in other
129. Recent Washington decisions appear not to have applied the substantial relationship test
to a substantive due process challenge. The stated test is based on the test applied in Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
130. 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305, § 100.
131. See supra text accompanying note 88.
132. Danzon, The Effects of Tort Reforms on the Frequency and Severity of Medical
Malpractice Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 413, 416 (1987). Professor Danzon found that "[t]he
average impact of statutes to limit all or part of the plaintiff's recovery has been to reduce average
severity by twenty-three percent." I.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
134. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
135. Eg., Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 914 (1977). But see supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. There appear to be no
recent Washington decisions in which a court applied intermediate scrutiny to a statute
challenged on substantive due process grounds.
136. See Aetna Life Ins. v. Washington Life & Disability Guar., 83 Wash. 2d 523, 533-34,
520 P.2d 162, 169 (1974); Seattle Times v. Tielsch, 80 Wash. 2d 502, 512, 495 P.2d 1366, 1371
(1972) (Finley, J., dissenting).
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states, which courts have consistently rejected substantive due process
challenges to medical malpractice damages limits.1 37
These considerations probably will influence a court not to find a
substantive due process violation but will not interfere with the deter-
mination of the equal protection challenge. Under the equal protec-
tion guarantee of the state constitution, the statute should be stricken.
The state equal protection test is whether the statute's classifications
have a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. 3
This test differs slightly from due process intermediate scrutiny. It
examines whether the statute's discriminatory effect, rather than the
statute's aggregate effect, bears a substantial relationship to the stat-
ute's purpose.
Courts that have used intermediate scrutiny to review medical mal-
practice damages limits either have found that the limits failed the
substantial relationship test13 9 or have remanded the cases to the trial
courts for further factual determinations. 1" The North Dakota court
in Arneson v. Olson 141 applied intermediate scrutiny to that state's
medical malpractice damages ceiling and found the ceiling violative of
the state equal protection guarantee. The court found that the limit
benefited physicians but denied adequate compensation to plaintiffs
with proven meritorious claims and did nothing toward the elimina-
tion of nonmeritorious claims.'42
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Carson v. Maurer, 143 in
applying intermediate scrutiny to a medical malpractice damages cap
challenged under the New Hampshire equal protection guarantee, also
found no substantial relationship between the cap and the legislative
purpose. The court rather found that "[i]t is simply unfair and unrea-
137. See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 368, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); Rose v. Doctors Hosp. Facilities, 735 S.W.2d
244 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). The courts in Fein and Rose applied minimal, rather than
intermediate, scrutiny.
138. See Hunter v. North Mason School Dist., 85 Wash. 2d 810, 814, 539 P.2d 845, 848
(1975).
139. See Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925,
424 A.2d 825 (1980). Contra Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980)
(purported to invoke substantial relationship test but in fact decided equal protection challenge
under rational basis test).
140. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert denied, 431 U.S.
914 (1977); Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985). On at least one of these
remands, the limit was held unconstitutional. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 785 n.2 (W.D.
Va. 1986) (citing Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, Nos. 55527, 55586 (4th Dist. Idaho Nov. 3,
1980)).
141. 270 N.W.2d 125, 135 (N.D. 1978).
142. Id. at 135-36.
143. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (1980).
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sonable to impose the burden of supporting the medical care industry
solely upon those persons who are most severely injured and therefore
most in need of compensation."'"
Washington's cap denies equal protection for similar reasons. The
cap denies adequate compensation to the most seriously injured plain-
tiffs, plaintiffs with proven meritorious claims, and imposes on them
the burden of supporting the insurance industry. The legislative object
of preserving insurance availability and affordability is not substan-
tially related to the classifications of plaintiffs according to whether
their damages are economic or noneconomic, whether their
noneconomic damages are above or below an arbitrary limit, or
whether they are young or old.145 The difference between economic
loss and noneconomic loss is that economic loss is quantified by doc-
tors, hospitals, and employers, who establish the monetary value of
past and future medical care and lost wages, whereas noneconomic
loss is quantified by laypersons who sit on juries. There is no substan-
tial relationship between the distinction and the legislative purpose.
The distinction merely enforces a suspicion of claims for noneconomic
loss.
The statute's classifications may not even have a substantial rela-
tionship to a reduction in insurer uncertainty and liability. Although
the statute forbids the instruction of juries as to the existence of a
limit, it seems likely that citizens eventually will learn that the limit
exists.' 46 Such knowledge might encourage juries that wish to avoid
the statute to categorize their awards as economic damages, which are
unlimited under the statute.
Additionally, the legislature cannot guarantee that a reduction in
insurer uncertainty and liability will be passed along to the entities
144. 424 A.2d at 837. There are many analogies between automobile guest statutes-and the
reasons for abolishing such statutes-and contemporary tort reform legislation. Consider the
discussion of guest statutes in W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
215-17 (5th ed. 1984). Washington repealed its guest statute in 1974. Id. at 216 n.84.
145. A 55-year-old male who has suffered severe and permanent injuries is limited to
$177,610 in noneconomic damages, whereas a 25-year-old male who has suffered severe injuries
from which he will completely recover within a year can recover as much as $399,102 in
noneconomic damages. See WASH. REv. CODE § 4.56.250 (1987); WASH. SuP. CT. COMM'N ON
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, s pra note 32; WASH. STATE EMPLOYMENT SEC. DEP'T LABOR MKT. &
ECON. ANALYSis BRANCH, supra note 32. "There is no substantial relationship or rational basis
asserted which the court could accept for that difference in classification." Foster v. Fibreboard
Corp., No. 87-2-05629-5, slip op. at 9 (Wash. Super. Ct order on pre-trial motion Sept. 18,
1987).
146. For example, a front-page newspaper story in the Seattle Times recently announced that
a trial court judge had ruled the Washington limit unconstitutional. Judge Rules Lid on Injury
Awards Unconstitutional, Seattle Times, Feb. 20, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
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that must buy liability insurance. Aggregate awards may have
dropped after medical malpractice damages caps were imposed in the
mid-1970's, but there might be no relationship between the drop in
awards and the promise of available and affordable liability insurance.
The classifications are not substantially related to the legislative end.
While a rational relationship might exist between the classifications
and the end, this relationship does not rise to the level of substantial-
ity. The damages limit therefore denies the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the Washington Constitution.'47
C. Washington Constitution: Right of Trial by Jury
Washington's limit on damages requires the trial court to reduce the
jury's determination of noneconomic damages when the jury's award
exceeds the statute's ceiling. This interference with the jury function
raises another constitutional challenge. The Washington Constitution
provides that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate."' 48
The word "inviolate" in the provision means "freedom from substan-
tial impairment" but does not prohibit modification of administrative
details that do not affect the enjoyment of the right to a jury trial.149
Washington's noneconomic damages limit abridges the jury trial
guarantee.' 50 The guarantee limits the authority of the legislature to
take away the right to a jury trial.' 5 ' The damages limit does more
than modify administrative details; it substantially impairs the jury
trial right.
More than one court already has invalidated a damages limit on
right to jury trial grounds. In Boyd v. Bulala 152 a federal district court
judge held that both the federal and Virginia constitutional guarantees
of the right to a jury trial were violated by Virginia's $750,000 limit on
147. Because Washington's equal protection guarantee does not prohibit the grant of special
privileges or immunities to municipal corporations, the damages limit probably is not
unconstitutional on state equal protection grounds when applied to a municipality. See WASH.
CONST. art I, § 12.
148. Id. art. I, § 21.
149. State v. Furth, 5 Wash. 2d 1, 18-19, 104 P.2d 925, 933 (1940).
150. Foster v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 87-2-05629-5, slip op. at 12 (Wash. Super. Ct. order on
pre-trial motion Sept. 18, 1987); accord Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986)
(Virginia damages ceiling violates federal and Virginia guarantees of right to jury trial). Contra
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980) (Indiana damages cap does
not violate jury trial provision of Indiana constitution).
151. State v. Ellis, 22 Wash. 129, 131, 60 P. 136, 137 (1900), overruled on other grounds, State
v. Lane, 40 Wash. 2d 734, 246 P.2d 474 (1952).
152. 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986).
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damages recoverable in medical malpractice actions.15 3 The court
found that the federal jury trial guarantee provided the right to have
the jury determine not only liability but damages.154 According to the
court, the statutory limit, which required "entering a judgment prede-
termined by the legislature in place of a judgment on a verdict prop-
erly reached by a jury," had no permissible basis. 155 At least two
Washington trial courts, on pre-trial motions, have rejected the
defense of the damages limit partly on right of trial by jury grounds.'56
The determination of the plaintiff's damages, including non-
economic damages,5 7 is a question of fact for the jury. 5 The statu-
tory cap, in effect, permits the legislature to reexamine and modify the
findings of the jury. This interference is especially inappropriate in
view of the authority of a judge to set aside an excessive verdict and
order a new trial, enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or order
remittitur where the evidence does not support the verdict. This
authority is well-established both at common law and in modem court
rules. 159 Unlike a statutory damages cap, these judicial interventions
are exercised neither arbitrarily nor in disregard of the facts proved at
trial.
Washington's damages cap ignores facts proved at trial. It takes
into account only the plaintiff's age and the average annual state wage
and not the seriousness of either the injury or the loss. The statute
153. Id. at 789; see also Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1088-89 (Fla. 1987)
(Florida tort reform damages cap invalidated partly because it.denies plaintiff constitutional
benefit of jury trial). The Boyd court later refused to reconsider its holding. Boyd v. Bulala, 672
F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Va. 1987).
154. 647 F. Supp. at 788 ("Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such
importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming
curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care." (quoting
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935))).
155. Id. at 789.
156. Foster v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 87-2-05629-5, slip op. at 12 (Wash. Super. Ct. order on
pre-trial motion Sept. 18, 1987); Carter v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 87-2-03555-7, slip op. at 30
(Wash. Super. Ct. order on pre-trial motion Feb. 19, 1988). In Foster, King County Superior
Court Judge Ellington declared that the limit "renders the right to a jury trial not substantive,
not fully extended." Foster v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 87-2-05629-5, slip op. at 12 (Wash. Super.
Ct. order on pre-trial motion Sept. 18, 1987).
157. Power v. Union Pac. R.R., 655 F.2d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1981) (under Washington law,
amount of damages for loss of companionship is left to trier of fact); Farman v. Farman, 25
Wash. App. 896, 611 P.2d 1314 (1980) (amount of damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress is question for trier of fact).
158. Shea v. City of Spokane, 17 Wash. App. 236, 562 P.2d 264 (1977) (proof of damages is
question of fact for jury); Baker v. Prewitt, 3 Wash. Terr. 595, 19 P. 149 (1888) (where amount of
damages is not fixed, agreed upon, or liquidated, jury must be called unless waived).
159. Some such common-law rules have become court rules. E-g., WASH. SUPER. Cr. Civ.
R. 59(a)(5) (judge may set aside excessive verdict and order new trial).
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"invades the province of the jury and restricts the jury's ability to




Washington's damages limit violates the state equal protection and
right of trial by jury guarantees. Under the state equal protection pro-
vision, courts should give the statute intermediate scrutiny. This stan-
dard of review is supported by Washington case law, case law in other
states, and public policy considerations. Because the statute's classifi-
cations are not substantially related to a legitimate legislative interest,
the statute denies tort plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws. The
statute denies the right of trial by jury because it materially invades
the province of the jury to find facts.
State constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection
should not be understood by courts merely to restate the fourteenth
amendment. Washington courts can and do grant greater protections
of individual rights under the state constitution. Such protection is
warranted in the review of legislation that classifies and affects the
rights of tort victims.
Marco de Sa e Silva
160. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 789 (W.D. Va. 1986).
161. The limit by its terms applies to all "action[s] seeking damages for personal injury or
death." WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.250(2) (1987). Nevertheless, the limit is not unconstitutional
on jury trial grounds as to all such actions, but rather only to actions for personal injury.
Whether a person is entitled to a jury trial under the Washington Constitution depends on
whether the right existed in 1889, when the Washington Constitution was adopted. Firchau v.
Gaskill, 88 Wash. 2d 109, 558 P.2d 194 (1977). The right to a jury trial in a civil action existed
in Washington in 1889. See Baker v. Prewitt, 3 Wash. Terr. 595, 19 P. 149 (1888) (breach of
warranty action); Northern Pac. R.R. v. Holmes, 3 Wash. Terr. 543, 18 P. 76 (1888) (negligence
action). The state constitution therefore preserves the right. On the other hand, the cause of
action for wrongful death did not exist until created by the legislature in 1917. 1917 Wash. Laws
ch. 123, § 1. Although parties to a claim for wrongful death have a right to a jury trial, that right
is statutory and not constitutional.
The distinction may cause a court to sever the application of the damages limit as to personal
injury actions but leave intact the limit as to wrongful death. Contra Carter v. Fibreboard Corp.,
No. 87-2-03555-7, slip op. at 31 (Wash. Super. Ct. order on pre-trial motion Feb. 19, 1988) (jury
trial right exists regardless of "whether the right was created by statute or existed at common
law"). Severance would, in effect, amend Washington's wrongful death act to provide for a limit
on noneconomic damages. Such a limit is probably constitutional under the Washington jury
trial guarantee. See Hall v. Gillins, 13 Il1. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958). But see White v. State,
203 Mont. 363, 661 P.2d 1272 (1983).
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TABLE: REPORTED DECISIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE AND TORT REFORM DAMAGES LIMrrs. This Table gathers in
chronological order recent decisions on the constitutionality of medical malpractice
and tort reform damages limits. The Table does not include cases that have been
overruled or that merely follow binding precedent. Where both a state and federal
court have decided the constitutionality of the same statute, the Table reports both
decisions. For citations to the following cases, see footnotes 38-49.
CASE
Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp.
(Ill. 1976)
Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine
(Idaho 1976)
Simon v. St. Eliz'th Med. Cntr.
(Ohio C.P. 1976)
Prendergast v. Nelson (Neb. 1977)
Arneson v. Olson (N.D. 1978)
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp.
(Ind. 1980)
Carson v. Maurer (N.H. 1980)
Baptist Hosp. v. Baber (Tex. App.
1984)
Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Hobrecht
(Fex. App. 1985)
Fein v. Permanente Medical
Group (Calif. 1985)
Detar Hosp. v. Estrada (Tex.
App. 1985)
Hoffman v. United States (9th
Cir. 1985)
Duren v. Suburban Comm'y
Hosp. (Ohio C.P. 1985)
Sibley v. Board of Supervisors
(La. 1985)
Waggoner v. Gibson (N.D. Tex.
1986)
Boyd v. Bulala (W.D. Va. 1986)
Lucas v. United States (5th Cir.
1986)
Smith v. Dep't of Ins. (Fla. 1987)
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Explanation of symbols:
Type of damages limited: A = All damages; G = General damages; NE = Noneconomic
damages; NM = Nonmedical damages
Standard of review: I = Intermediate; RB = Rational basis; NA = Not applicable; Q
= Unclear
Holding: C = Constitutional or not unconstitutional; UC = Unconstitutional; D =
Dictum; R = Not decided in reported case, remanded to trial court for decision as to
constitutionality
Grounds for court's decision: AC = Right of access to courts; DP = Due process; EP =
Equal protection; JT = Right of trial by jury; SL = Special legislation; SP = Special
privilege; Q = Unclear
Constitution relied on by court: B = Both federal and state constitutions; F = Federal
constitution only; S = State constitution only; Q = Unclear
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